We study assortment optimization problems when customers choose under the multinomial logit model with nested considerations sets. In this choice model, there are multiple customer types and a customer of a particular type is interested in purchasing only a particular subset of products. We use the term consideration set to refer to the subset of products that a customer of a particular type is interested in purchasing. The consideration sets of customers of different types are nested in the sense that the consideration set of one customer type is included in the consideration set of another. The choice process for customers of different types is governed by the same multinomial logit model except for the fact that customers of different types have different consideration sets. Given that customers choose according to the multinomial logit model with nested consideration sets and there is a revenue associated with each product, the assortment optimization problem finds a set of products to offer to the customers to maximize the expected revenue obtained from a customer. We show that the assortment optimization problem is NP-complete. Motivated by this complexity result, we give a fully polynomial time approximation scheme for the problem. Our approach exploits the fact that the consideration sets are nested and its running time is polynomial in both the number of products and customer types. We extend our approach to the case where each product occupies a certain amount of space and there is a constraint on the total space consumption of the offered products.
Incorporating customer choice behavior into revenue management models has been seeing considerable attention. In traditional revenue management models, it is common to represent the demand for a product by using an exogenous random variable. However, this way of modeling the demand becomes inadequate when there are multiple products that can serve the needs of a customer and the customers choose among the offered products. When the customers choose among the offered products, the demand for a particular product depends on what other products are offered, creating complex interactions between the demands for the products. Capturing the fact that the customers choose among the offered products is becoming more important than ever, as online sales channels bring a variety of products to the customers among which the customers make a choice. When modeling the customer choice process, a critical tradeoff is that a sophisticated choice model may capture the customer choice process more faithfully, but solving operational problems under a more sophisticated choice model may become intractable.
In this paper, we consider assortment optimization problems when customers choose among the offered products according to the multinomial logit model with nested consideration sets. In the assortment optimization problem, a firm has access to a set of products among which it picks an assortment of products to offer to its customers. There is a revenue associated with each product. Customers choose among the offered assortment of products according to a particular choice model. The goal of the firm is to pick an assortment of products to offer to maximize the expected revenue obtained from a customer. We capture the choice process of the customers by using the multinomial logit model with nested consideration sets. In this choice model, there are multiple customer types. A customer of a particular type is interested in purchasing only a particular subset of products. We use the term consideration set to refer to the subset of products that a customer of a particular type is interested in purchasing. The consideration sets of customers of different types are nested, which is to say that we can index the customer types such that the consideration set of a customer type with a smaller index is included in the consideration set of a customer type with a larger index. This consideration set structure arises when different customers are interested in products that satisfy different desired thresholds in a particular attribute, such as price or quality. The choice process for customers of different types is governed by the same multinomial logit model except for the fact that customers of different types have different consideration sets. When making a purchase, a customer observes which of the products in her consideration set are actually included in the offered assortment and she makes a choice only among these products according to the multinomial logit model.
Main Contributions. We show that the problem of finding the assortment of products that maximizes the expected revenue obtained from a customer is NP-complete. Motivated by this complexity result, we give a fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for the assortment optimization problem. To our knowledge, our FPTAS is the first algorithm that is directed at solving assortment optimization problems with multiple consideration sets, while making sure that the running time scales polynomially with the number of products, the number of customer types and the approximation guarantee. Our FPTAS is based on a dynamic programming formulation of the assortment optimization problem. In particular, since the consideration sets of different customer types are nested, we index the customer types such that the first customer type has the smallest consideration set and the last customer type has the largest consideration set. In our dynamic programming formulation, the decision epochs correspond to the customer types in the order of increasing consideration sets. The value functions correspond to the maximum expected revenue obtained from customer types corresponding to the current and future decision epochs. In each decision epoch, we decide whether we should offer the product that is included in the consideration set of the current customer type, but not in the consideration sets of the previous customer types. This dynamic programming formulation yields a pseudo polynomial time algorithm. To develop an FPTAS, we discretize the state space of the dynamic program by using a logarithmic grid. By using this approach, we show that if there are n products among which the firm picks an assortment, then we can obtain a solution that provides 1 − ϵ fraction of the optimal expected revenue in O(n 3 log(nR max ) log(nV max ) / ϵ 2 ) operations. In the last expression, R max is related to the largest revenue and preference weight, whereas V max is related to the largest preference weight among all of the products in the multinomial logit model. We generalize our approach to the case where each product consumes a certain amount of space and there is a constraint on the total space consumption of the offered products. A naive approach to deal with such a space constraint is to augment the state variable of our earlier dynamic programming formulation, where the additional component of the state variable keeps track of the total space consumption of the products offered until the current decision epoch. This approach is not useful to develop an FPTAS under a space constraint since if we discretize the additional component of the state variable by using a logarithmic grid, then it is not guaranteed that the solution that we obtain by using the discretized state space satisfies the space constraint for the original problem. We get around this difficulty by using a different dynamic programming formulation. In particular, we use an additional component in the state variable, which keeps track of the target expected revenue that we plan to obtain from customer types corresponding to the current and future decision epochs. The value functions correspond to the minimum space consumption of the products that are offered in the current and future decision epochs, while making sure that we satisfy the target expected revenue. By discretizing the state space in this dynamic programming formulation, we show that we can obtain a solution that provides 1 − ϵ fraction of the optimal expected revenue in O(n 4 log(nR max ) log(nV max ) log(nR max V max /λ min ) / ϵ 3 ) operations. In the last expression, λ min is the smallest arrival probability over all of the customer types.
We use the multinomial logit model with nested consideration sets to capture the choice process of the customers. In this choice model, the consideration set of one customer type is included in the consideration set of another, naturally with the exception of the largest consideration set. In other words, we can order the products {1, . . . , n} such that the consideration sets of the different customer types are given by {1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, . . . , {1, . . . , n}. The choice process of customers of different types are governed by the same multinomial logit model except for the fact that customers of different types have different consideration sets. This consideration set structure becomes especially useful when customers of different types drop different products from consideration based on cutoff values for a particular attribute, such as quality or price. The fact that customers of different types choose according to the same multinomial logit model implies that among the products that remain in consideration, the relative attractiveness of different products are the same for all of the customer types. For example, ordering the products such that product 1 has the lowest price and product n has the highest price, customers may form their consideration sets by focusing on the products within their budget. A customer with a consideration set {1, . . . , k} focuses on products whose prices do not exceed the price of product k. On the other hand, ordering the products such that product 1 has the highest quality and product n has the lowest quality, a customer with a consideration set {1, . . . , k} focuses on products whose quality is no worse than the quality of product k. In general, our nested consideration set structure is applicable to situations where the products can be ordered objectively according to a certain attribute value and customers of different types drop products from consideration based on cutoff values for the attribute. This consideration set structure captures a variety of realistic customer behavior to eliminate products and it is motivated by our interactions with a large online retailer. In our conclusions at the end, we also describe an extension to a somewhat more general consideration set structure.
There is work on extending discrete choice models to capture the fact that the customers have consideration sets and they do not consider all of the products offered by a firm. Most of these choice models take the form of two stage models, where the customers form a consideration set in the first stage and they choose among the offered products in their consideration sets in the second stage. In the first stage, customers form their consideration sets by using factors such as prices, promotions, brand images and prior familiarity associated with the products. In the second stage, standard choice models are usually used to capture the choice process within the consideration set. Manrai and Andrews (1998) provide a detailed review of the two stage choice models and our choice model falls under the scope of such two stage choice models. We also have connections to the elimination by aspects model of Tversky (1972) , where customers eliminate products based on whether the attributes of the products satisfy certain cutoff values. In our choice model, there is one attribute and customers of different types have different cutoff values for this attribute.
Literature Review. Operations management literature recently started to focus on models where the customers form consideration sets and choose only among the offered products in their consideration sets. We begin by covering the recent operations management literature that uses choice models with consideration sets. Jagabathula and Vulcano (2015) use the idea of inertia to form a consideration set, where a customer considers the product that she purchased during the last store visit and the products that are in promotion. Once a customer forms her consideration set, she chooses within her consideration set according to a nonparametric choice model, where she has a preference order for the products and purchases the highest ranking offered product in the preference order. The authors focus on estimating the parameters of the choice model. Jagabathula and Rusmevichientong (2015) consider a choice model where a customer considers only the products whose prices are below a certain threshold and chooses among those products according to a nonparametric choice model. The authors discuss estimating the parameters of the choice model and give an algorithm to find an assortment of products to offer and the prices of the offered products to maximize the expected revenue obtained from each customer. Sahin and Wang (2014) develop a choice model that incorporates the cost of searching for products. Their choice model can be interpreted as a choice model with consideration sets since the set of products that a customer chooses from can be different from what the firm offers. Dai et al. (2014) develop a revenue management model with parallel flight legs and explicitly address the fact that a customer may not consider purchasing some of the itineraries offered by the airline due to personal restrictions on, for example, time of departure. Gilbride and Allenby (2004) describe a choice model where customers screen products based on various rules. Among the products that remain in consideration, the customers choose according to the random utility maximization principle, where each customer associates a random utility with each product and chooses the product that provides the largest utility. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, Manrai and Andrews (1998) provide a detailed review of the two stage choice models with consideration sets, but they do not focus on solving operational problems. Siddarth et al. (1995) , Andrews and Srinivasan (1995) , Roberts and Lattin (1991) , Hauser and Wernerfelt (1990) , Fader and McAlister (1990) and Swait and Ben-Akiva (1987) in discrete choice modeling literature give extensive empirical evidence that explicitly modeling the consideration sets of the customers can provide better predictions of the purchase patterns. Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) and Gallego et al. (2004) study assortment optimization problems when customers choose according to the multinomial logit model. Their model has a single customer type that considers all offered products. They show that the assortment that maximizes the expected revenue obtained from each customer can be computed efficiently. Bront et al. (2009) , Desir and Goyal (2013) and Rusmevichientong et al. (2014) study assortment optimization problems under a mixture of multinomial logit models, where there are multiple customer types and customers of different types choose according to multinomial logit models with different parameters. They show that the problem is NP-complete and provide approximation algorithms, heuristics and integer programming formulations. If one is interested in getting solutions that are arbitrarily close to optimal, then the running times of their approximation algorithms increase exponentially with the number of customer types. Exploiting the nested consideration set structure, the running time of our FPTAS increases polynomially with the number of customer types. Li and Rusmevichientong (2014) , Davis et al. (2014) and Feldman and Topaloglu (2015) consider assortment optimization problems under the nested logit model with a single customer type.
Organization. In Section 1, we formulate the assortment optimization problem under the multinomial logit model with nested consideration sets and show that the problem is NP-complete. In Section 2, we give a dynamic programming formulation of the problem. In Section 3, we build on the dynamic programming formulation to develop our FPTAS. In Section 4, we extend our results to the case where each product occupies a certain amount of space and there is a constraint on the total space consumption of the offered products. In Section 5, we provide a numerical study for our FPTAS. In Section 6, we conclude.
Problem Formulation
There are n products indexed by {1, . . . , n}. The revenue associated with product j is r j . We use the vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ {0, 1} n to capture the set of products offered to customers, where x j = 1 if product j is offered and x j = 0 if product j is not offered. There are n customer types indexed by {1, . . . , n}. A customer arriving into the system is of type k with probability λ k . A customer of type k considers purchasing only the products in the set {1, . . . , k}. We refer to the set {1, . . . , k} as the consideration set of a customer of type k. A customer of type k chooses among the products in her consideration set according to the multinomial logit model. In particular, using v j to denote the preference weight of product j and v 0 to denote the preference weight of the no purchase option, if the set of products offered to the customers is given by the vector x, then a customer of type k chooses product j ∈ {1, . . . , k} with probability
Thus, if the set of products offered to the customers is given by the vector x, then we obtain an expected revenue of
We can find the set of products to offer to maximize the expected revenue obtained from a customer by solving the problem
where the equality follows from the definition of P jk (x). In our choice model, we observe that if two products j and i are offered and they are in the consideration sets of two customer types k and l, then we have
Intuitively speaking, the ratio P jk (x)/P ik (x) captures the relative attractiveness of products j and i to a customer of type k. Thus, our choice model implies that the relative attractiveness of products j and i to a customer does not depend on the type of the customer, as long as these products are in the consideration set of the customer. However, if a product is not in the consideration set of a customer, then the customer does not consider purchasing this product at all. Therefore, our choice model becomes particularly useful when customers of different types drop different products from consideration based on cutoff values for quality or price, but among the products that remain in consideration, the relative attractiveness of different products are the same for customers of all types. For example, products indexed with smaller indices may be of higher quality. A customer of type k may be interested in product k and products of higher quality than product k.
In our choice model, v 0 captures the attractiveness of leaving the system without making a purchase. Given that customers of different types have different numbers of products in their consideration sets, it is reasonable to expect that the attractiveness of leaving the system without making a purchase can be different for different customer types. In problem (1), we can allow the preference weight of the no purchase option to depend on the customer type by replacing v 0 with v 0k , where v 0k is the preference weight of the no purchase option for a customer of type k. All of our results in the paper continue to hold with straightforward modifications under this extension. We come back to this extension at several points in the paper and describe how we can incorporate this extension into our results. In the remainder of this section, we show that problem (1) is NP-complete. This result motivates us to develop an FPTAS for problem (1) by building on an appropriate dynamic programming formulation of the problem. To show that problem (1) is NP-complete, we focus on the following feasibility version of the problem.
Assortment Feasibility. We are given an expected revenue threshold K. The assortment feasibility problem asks whether there exists a vector x ∈ {0, 1} n that provides an expected revenue of K or more in problem (1).
To show that problem (1) is NP-complete, we use a reduction from Partition problem, which is a well-known NP-complete problem; see Garey and Johnson (1979) . In particular, we show that any instance of the Partition problem can be reduced to the assortment feasibility problem. Rusmevichientong et al. (2014) also use a reduction from the Partition problem to show the NP-completeness of an assortment optimization problem under the multinomial logit model with multiple customer types, but they assume that customers of different types can associate completely different preference weights with a particular product. Our result shows that the assortment optimization problem remains NP-complete even when customers of different types associate the same preference weight with a particular product, as long as this product is in their consideration sets. The partition problem is defined as follows.
Partition. We are given n items indexed by {1, . . . , n}. There is an integer weight w j associated with item j and we have ∑ n j=1 w j = 2L for some integer L. The partition problem asks whether there exists a vector x ∈ {0, 1} n such that
Theorem 1
The assortment feasibility problem is NP-complete.
Proof. Assume that we are given an instance of the partition problem with n items, where the weight of item j is w j and we have ∑ n j=1 w j = 2L. We define an instance of the assortment feasibility problem as follows. There are n + 1 products. The revenues of the products are given by r j = 2 for all j = 1, . . . , n and r n+1 = 7, whereas the preference weights of the products are given by v j = w j for all j = 1, . . . , n and v n+1 = 4L. The preference weight of the no purchase option is v 0 = L. The probabilities of observing different customer types are given by λ j = 0 for all j = 1, . . . , n − 1, λ n = λ n+1 = 1/2. Finally, the expected revenue threshold in the assortment feasibility problem is K = 3. In the rest of the proof, we show that there exists a set of products to offer that provides an expected revenue of K = 3 or more in the assortment feasibility problem if and only if there exists a vector x ∈ {0, 1} n such that
Product n + 1 has the largest revenue among the n + 1 products. Thus, it is straightforward to show that offering this product always increases the expected revenue from any set of products, in which case, the only question for the assortment feasibility problem is to choose a set of products among the products {1, . . . , n} to obtain an expected revenue of K = 3 or more. We use the vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = {0, 1} n to capture which of the products {1, . . . , n} we offer in the assortment feasibility problem, where x j = 1 if product j is offered and x j = 0 if product j is not offered. Since we always offer product n + 1, as a function of x ∈ {0, 1} n , the expected revenue in the assortment feasibility problem can be written as 1 2
Therefore, there exists a set of products that provides an expected revenue of K = 3 or more if and only if there exists a vector x ∈ {0, 1} n such that
We write this inequality as (
, which by distributing the terms, is equivalent to
Canceling the terms in the inequality above yields (
Therefore, there exists a set of products that provides an expected revenue of K = 3 or more if and only if there exists a vector x ∈ {0, 1} n such that (
but the last inequality holds if and only if
Therefore, there exists a set of products that provides an expected revenue of K = 3 or more if and only if there exists a vector x ∈ {0, 1} n such that ∑ n j=1 w j x j = L, but the last statement is precisely what the partition problem is interested in.
In the next section, we give a dynamic programming formulation for problem (1). This dynamic programming formulation forms the starting point for our FPTAS.
Dynamic Programming Formulation
To see the dynamic programming formulation of problem (1), assume that we have already decided which of the products in {1, . . . , j − 1} are offered to the customers and these decisions are given by (x 1 , . . . , x j−1 ) ∈ {0, 1} j−1 , where x k = 1 if product k is offered and x k = 0 if product k is not offered. We use P j to denote
In this case, the expected revenue from a customer of type j is given by
, where x j = 1 if product j is offered and x j = 0 if product j is not offered. Therefore, once we decide whether product j is offered, we can compute the expected revenue from a customer of type j as a function of only P j , S j and x j . Furthermore, we can compute
which are also functions of only P j , S j and x j . These observations imply that we can solve problem (1) as a dynamic program. The decision epochs in the dynamic program correspond to the customer types. The state variable at decision epoch j corresponds to the pair (P j , S j ). The decision at decision epoch j corresponds to whether we offer product j. The reward at decision epoch j is the expected revenue from a customer of type j. Given that the decisions for the products in {1, . . . , j −1} satisfy
be the maximum expected revenue from customers of type {j, . . . , n}. We can compute {V j (·, ·) : j = 1, . . . , n} through the dynamic program
with the boundary condition that V n+1 (·, ·) = 0. Once we compute {V j (·, ·) : j = 1, . . . , n} through the dynamic program in (2), the optimal objective value of problem (1) is given by z * = V 1 (0, 0). To develop an FPTAS for problem (1), we use an approximate version of the dynamic program in (2) that is based on discretizing the state space. In particular, we choose a value of ρ > 0 and focus on the grid points in the domain
which is a logarithmic grid of size 1 + ρ augmented by an additional point at zero. We define the round down operator ⌊·⌋ that rounds its argument down to the closest value in Dom ρ . That is, we have ⌊x⌋ = max{y ∈ Dom ρ : y ≤ x}. Similarly, we define the round up operator ⌈·⌉ that rounds its argument up to the closest value in Dom ρ , which is given by ⌈x⌉ = min{y ∈ Dom ρ : y ≥ x}. We consider an approximate version of the dynamic program in (2) given by
with the boundary condition that Θ n+1 (·, ·) = 0. On the right side above, we round the first and second components of the state respectively down and up, which ultimately allows us to bound the gap between V j (P j , S j ) and Θ j (P j , S j ). Note that to solve the dynamic program in (3), we need to store the value of Θ j (P j , S j ) only for (P j , S j ) ∈ Dom ρ × Dom ρ and j = 1, . . . , n.
If customers of different types associate different preference weights with the no purchase option, then we can simply replace v 0 in (3) with v 0j , which is the preference weight that a customer of type j associates with the no purchase option. In the next lemma, we give an elementary property of the dynamic program in (3) that shows that if the value of P j decreases by no more than a factor of 1 + ρ and the value of S j increases by no more than a factor of 1 + ρ, then the value of Θ j (P j , S j ) decreases by no more than a factor of (1 + ρ) 2 . This result follows by the fact that if we decrease P j by no more than a factor of 1 + ρ and increase S j by no more than a factor of 1 + ρ, then P j + r j v j x j decreases by no more than a factor of 1 + ρ and v 0 + S j + v j x j increases by no more than a factor of 1 + ρ, in which case, λ j (P j + r j v j x j )/(v 0 + S j + v j x j ) in the dynamic program in (3) decreases by no more than a factor of (1 + ρ) 2 . We defer the full proof to Appendix A.1.
Lemma 2 Assume that
In the next proposition, we build on Lemma 2 to bound the gap between V j (P j , S j ) and Θ j (P j , S j ) in one direction.
Proposition 3 For all
Proof. We show the result by using induction over the customer types. Since we have V n+1 (P n+1 , S n+1 ) = 0 = Θ n+1 (P n+1 , S n+1 ), comparing the dynamic programs in (2) and (3), it follows that V n (P n , S n ) = Θ n (P n , S n ) and the result holds for customer type n. Assuming that the result holds for customer type j + 1, we show that the result holds for customer type j. By the induction assumption, for any x j ∈ {0, 1}, we have
, which can equivalently be written as
Using this inequality together with the inequality in (4), it follows that
for any x j ∈ {0, 1}. Letting x * j be an optimal solution to the problem on the right side of (2) and using the last inequality, we obtain
where the last inequality above uses the fact that x * j is a feasible, but not necessarily an optimal, solution to the problem on the right side of (3).
Fully Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme
Proposition 3 does not yet show how to obtain a solution to problem (1) with a performance guarantee. We propose the following algorithm to obtain such a solution.
Step 0.
. . , n} by using the dynamic program in (3). Set j = 1,P 1 = 0 andS 1 = 0.
Step 1. Given the values ofP j andS j , to decide whether to offer product j, letx j be an optimal solution to the problem
Step 2. Increase j by 1. If j ≤ n, then go to Step 1. Otherwise, stop and return (x 1 , . . . ,x n ).
Since the round down and up operators depend on the value of ρ, the output of the algorithm above depends on the value of ρ as well and we refer to this algorithm as Apprx(ρ) algorithm, where Apprx stands for approximation and ρ emphasizes its dependence on ρ. The product offer decisions from Apprx(ρ) algorithm are given by (x 1 , . . . ,x n ). Our goal is to show that these product offer decisions provide a performance guarantee for problem (1). To compute the expected revenue provided by the product offer decisions (x 1 , . . . ,x n ), noting the steps of the Apprx(ρ) algorithm, we observe thatP 2 =P 1 + r 1 v 1x1 = r 1 v 1x1 . Similarly, we haveP 3 =P 2 + r 2 v 2x2 , in which case, using the last equality yieldsP 3 = r 1 v 1x1 + r 2 v 2x2 . Through successive substitutions, it follows that if (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) and (P 1 , . . . ,P n ) are generated by the Apprx(ρ) algorithm, then we haveP j = ∑ j−1 k=1 r k v kxk for all j = 1, . . . , n. Through a similar reasoning, it also follows that if (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) and (S 1 , . . . ,S n ) are generated by the Apprx(ρ) algorithm, then we haveS j = ∑ j−1 k=1 v kxk for all j = 1, . . . , n as well. We define {Π j : j = 1, . . . , n} recursively as
with the boundary condition that Π n+1 = 0. Adding the equality above for all j = 1, . . . , n, we get
, in which case, noting (1), it follows that Π 1 is the expected revenue provided by the product offer decisions (x 1 , . . . ,x n ). It is possible to relate the expected revenue Π 1 to {Θ j (·, ·) : j = 1, . . . , n} computed through the dynamic program in (3). To show this relationship, we use the next lemma, which gives an elementary property of the dynamic program in (3) and shows that as the value of P j increases and the value of S j decreases, the value of Θ j (P j , S j ) increases. This result follows from the fact that if P j increases and S j decreases, then λ j (P j + r j v j x j )/(v 0 + S j + v j x j ) in the dynamic program in (3) increases. We defer the full proof to Appendix A.2.
Lemma 4 Assume that
In the next proposition, we use Lemma 4 to relate the expected revenue from the product offer decisions (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) to {Θ j (·, ·) : j = 1, . . . , n} computed through the dynamic program in (3).
Proposition 5 Assume that
Proof. We show the result by using induction over the customer types. We have
where the first equality follows from the dynamic program in (3), the second equality follows from the way we computex n in Step 1 of the Apprx(ρ) algorithm and the third equality follows from the definition of Π j . Therefore, the result holds for customer type n. Assuming that the result holds for customer type j + 1, we show that the result holds for customer type j. By the induction assumption, we have Θ j+1 (P j+1 
, where the equality follows from the way we computeP j+1 and S j+1 in Step 1 of the Apprx(ρ) algorithm. In this case, since the last chain of inequalities imply
where the second equality is by the way we computex j in Step 1 of the Apprx(ρ) algorithm and the third equality is by (3).
We use Rev to denote the expected revenue from the product offer decisions (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) generated by the Apprx(ρ) algorithm. By the discussion right before Lemma 4, Rev = Π 1 . By Proposition 5, we have Π 1 ≥ Θ 1 (P 1 ,S 1 ). SinceP 1 = 0 andS 1 = 0, it follows that Rev = Π 1 ≥ Θ 1 (P 1 ,S 1 ) = Θ 1 (0, 0). Therefore, the expected revenue from the product offer decisions generated by the Apprx(ρ) algorithm is at least Θ 1 (0, 0). In the next theorem, we give a performance guarantee for the product offer decisions (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) generated by the Apprx(ρ) algorithm.
Theorem 6 Letting Rev be the expected revenue from the product offer decisions generated by the
Proof. Noting the discussion right before the theorem, we have Rev ≥ Θ 1 (0, 0) by Proposition 5, whereas by Proposition 3, we have
By the discussion that follows the dynamic program in (2), V 1 (0, 0) corresponds to the optimal expected revenue in problem (1). Thus, Theorem 6 shows that the expected revenue obtained by the product offer decisions generated by the Apprx(ρ) algorithm deviates from the optimal expected revenue by no more than a factor of (1 + ρ) 2(n−1) . Next, we focus on the computation time for the Apprx(ρ) algorithm. Without loss of generality, we assume that the revenues and the preference weights of the products satisfy r j ≥ 1 and v j ≥ 1 for all j = 1, . . . , n. If either one of these conditions do not hold, then we can scale up all revenues or all preference weights with the same quantity without changing the optimal solution to problem (1). For notational brevity, we let R max = max{r j v j : j = 1, . . . , n} and V max = max{v j : j = 1, . . . , n}, in which case,P j takes values in {0} ∪ [1, nR max ] andS j takes values in {0} ∪ [1, nV max ] in the Apprx(ρ) algorithm. Thus, for each customer type j, in Step 0 of the Apprx(ρ) algorithm, it is enough to compute {Θ(P j , S j ) : (P j , S j ) ∈ Dom ρ × Dom ρ } for the values of (P j , S j ) such that
where k 1 and
such values of (P j , S j ). Therefore, there are O(n log(nR max ) log(nV max ) / ρ 2 ) values to be computed in the collection
Step 0 of the Apprx(ρ)
algorithm. We can compute the values {Θ j (P j , S j ) : (P j , S j ) ∈ Dom ρ × Dom ρ , j = 1, . . . , n} by moving backwards through the customer types in the dynamic program in (3) and the computation of each one of these values takes O(1) operations. Therefore, we can execute Step 0 of the Apprx(ρ) algorithm in O(n log(nR max ) log(nV max )/ρ 2 ) operations. The number of operations in the other steps of the Apprx(ρ) algorithm are dominated by the number of operations in Step 0. In the next theorem, we use this computation time analysis and the performance guarantee given in Theorem 6 to provide an FPTAS for problem (1).
Theorem 7
Letting z * be the optimal objective value of problem (1), there exists an algorithm such that for any ϵ ∈ (0, 1), the algorithm runs in O(n 3 log(nR max ) log(nV max ) / ϵ 2 ) operations and generates product offer decisions with an expected revenue of at least
Proof. We run the Apprx(ρ) algorithm with ρ = ϵ/(4n) and let Rev be the expected revenue from the product offer decisions generated by this algorithm. By Theorem 6, it holds that z * ≤ (1 + ϵ/(4n)) 2(n−1) Rev. For ϵ ∈ (0, 1), using the standard inequalities (1 + ϵ/(4n)) 2(n−1) ≤ exp(ϵ/2) ≤ 1 + ϵ, we obtain z * ≤ (1 + ϵ) Rev and multiplying both sides of this inequality with 1 − ϵ, it follows that (1 − ϵ) z * ≤ (1 − ϵ 2 ) Rev ≤ Rev. Thus, the expected revenue from the product offer decisions generated by the Apprx(ρ) algorithm with ρ = ϵ/(4n) is at least (1 − ϵ) z * . The Apprx(ρ) algorithm runs in O(n log(nR max ) log(nV max )/ρ 2 ) operations. Replacing ρ with ϵ/4n yields the desired computation time.
We can extend our FPTAS to cover the case where there is a limit on the total number of offered products. If we have a limit on the total number of offered products, then we need an additional component in the state variable in the dynamic program in (2). When making the decision at decision epoch j, the additional component in the state variable keeps the total number of products offered among the products in {1, . . . , j − 1}. When the total number of products offered by decision epoch j reaches the limit on the total number of offered products, the only feasible decision in problem (2) is to set x j = 0. Since the additional component of the state variable takes integer values, there is no need to discretize this component of the state variable by using a logarithmic grid. Under this extension, all of our results continue to hold with essentially no modifications, but the number of operations in the Apprx(ρ) algorithm increases by a factor of n due to the additional component in the state variable.
In the next section, we consider the case where different products occupy different amounts of space and there is a constraint on the total space consumption of the offered products. Developing an FPTAS under such a constraint requires a different dynamic programming formulation.
Space Constraints
In this section, we consider the case where each product consumes a certain amount of space and there is a constraint on the total space consumption of the offered products. The space consumption of product j is c j . The limit on the total space consumption of the offered products is C. Our goal is to find a set of products to offer so that we maximize the expected revenue obtained from each customer, while making sure that the total space consumption of the offered products does not exceed the limit. Therefore, we want to solve the problem
Naturally, problem (5) is at least as difficult as problem (1) since an instance of problem (5) with C = ∑ n j=1 c j is equivalent to problem (1). Therefore, the NP-completeness result in Theorem 1 applies to problem (5) as well. In this section, we develop an FPTAS for problem (5) by using a dynamic programming formulation of this problem, but the dynamic programming formulation that we use for problem (5) is different from the dynamic programming formulation that we use earlier in the paper.
Dynamic Programming Formulation
To give a dynamic programming formulation for problem (5), assume that we have already decided which of the products in {1, . . . , j − 1} are offered to the customers and these decisions are given by (x 1 , . . . , x j−1 ) ∈ {0, 1} j−1 , where x k = 1 if product k is offered and x k = 0 if product k is not offered. Similar to our earlier dynamic programming formulation, we define P j and S j as
Given that the decisions for the products in {1, . . . , j − 1} satisfy
v k x k and we want to generate an expected revenue of R j or more from customers of type {j, . . . , n}, we let ϑ j (P j , S j , R j ) be the minimum total space consumption of the products in {j, . . . , n} to do so. In this case, we can compute {ϑ j (·, ·, ·) : j = 1, . . . , n} by using the dynamic program
with the boundary condition that
The dynamic program above follows from the following reasoning. Given that the decisions for the products in {1, . . . , j − 1} satisfy
Furthermore, if we want to generate an expected revenue of R j or more from customers of type {j, . . . , n}, then after making the decision for product j, the expected revenue that we want to generate from customers of type {j + 1, . . . , n} is R j − λ j P j +r j v j x j v 0 +S j +v j x j or more. The boundary condition follows from the fact that if make the decisions for all of the products and we still have a strictly positive expected revenue that we want to generate, then there is no set of products that provides the expected revenue that we want to generate. Once we compute {ϑ j (·, ·, ·) : j = 1, . . . , n} through the dynamic program in (6), ϑ 1 (0, 0, R 1 ) corresponds to the minimum total space consumption of the products in {1, . . . , n} given that we want to generate an expected revenue of R 1 or more from customers of type {1, . . . , n}. Therefore, the optimal objective value of problem (5) is given by z * = max{z ∈ ℜ + : ϑ 1 (0, 0, z) ≤ C}, which is the largest expected revenue that we can generate from customers of type {1, . . . , n} while making sure that the total space consumption of the products in {1, . . . , n} does not exceed C. Our FPTAS for problem (5) is based on discretizing the state space in the dynamic program in (6) by using a logarithmic grid of size 1 + ρ. In particular, letting Dom ρ , ⌊·⌋ and ⌈·⌉ be as defined in Section 2, we consider an approximate version of the dynamic program in (6) given by
We keep our notation in this section as close as possible to the one in Section 2 to emphasize the correspondence between the two sections.
We note that another possible way of formulating problem (5) as a dynamic program is based on keeping the total space consumption of the offered products in the state variable, but this approach is not useful when developing an FPTAS. In particular, if we discretize the component of the state variable that keeps the total space consumption of the offered products, then a solution that satisfies the space consumption constraint on the discretized state space may not be feasible for the original problem. In contrast, even after discretizing the state space, the dynamic program in (7) accounts for the total space consumption of the offered products accurately, but it discretizes the state space when accounting for the expected revenue obtained from different customer types. Thus, the dynamic program in (7) does not incur an approximation error when accounting for the total space consumption of the offered products, but it incurs an approximation error when accounting for the expected revenue obtained from different customer types.
The dynamic programs in (6) and (7) are qualitatively different from those in (2) and (3), since {ϑ j (·, ·, ·) : j = 1, . . . , n} and {Φ j (·, ·, ·) : j = 1, . . . , n} in the dynamic programs in (6) and (7) account for space consumption, whereas {V j (·, ·) : j = 1, . . . , n} and {Θ j (·, ·) : j = 1, . . . , n} account for expected revenue. Nevertheless, the sequence of results that we establish to develop an FPTAS by using the dynamic programs in (6) and (7) is similar to the sequence of our earlier results. Therefore, we defer most of the proofs in this section to the appendix. In the next proposition, we give a result that bounds the gap between ϑ j (P j , S j , R j ) and Φ j (P j , S j , R j ) in one direction. This proposition is analogous to Proposition 3 and its proof is in Appendix A.3.
Proposition 8 For all
j = 1, . . . , n, we have ϑ j (P j , S j , R j ) ≥ Φ j (P j , S j , R j / (1 + ρ) 3(n−j) ).
Fully Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme
Noting the discussion that follows the dynamic program in (6), the optimal objective value of problem (5) is given by z * = max{z ∈ ℜ + : ϑ 1 (0, 0, z) ≤ C}. We approximate the optimal objective value of problem (5) by usingz = max{z ∈ ℜ + : Φ 1 (0, 0, z) ≤ C}, where {Φ j (·, ·, ·) : j = 1, . . . , n} are computed through the approximate dynamic program in (7). Since z * is a feasible solution to the problem max{z ∈ ℜ + : ϑ 1 (0, 0, z) ≤ C}, we get ϑ 1 (0, 0, z * ) ≤ C. Also, by Proposition 8, we get Φ 1 (0, 0, z * / (1 + ρ) 3(n−1) ) ≤ ϑ 1 (0, 0, z * ). Thus, we get Φ 1 (0, 0, z * / (1 + ρ) 3(n−1) ) ≤ C, which implies that z * / (1 + ρ) 3(n−1) is a feasible solution to the problem max{z ∈ ℜ + : Φ 1 (0, 0, z) ≤ C}. Since the optimal objective value of the last problem is given byz, it follows thatz ≥ z * / (1+ρ) 3(n−1) . So, our approximationz for the optimal objective value of problem (5) deviates from the optimal objective value of problem (5) by at most a factor of (1 + ρ) 3(n−1) . To obtain a solution to problem (5) with a performance guarantee, we propose the following algorithm.
. . , n} by using the dynamic program in (7). Set j = 1,P 1 = 0,S 1 = 0 andR 1 = max{z ∈ ℜ + : Φ 1 (0, 0, z) ≤ C}.
Step 1. Given the values ofP j ,S j andR j , to decide whether to offer product j, letx j be an optimal solution to the problem min
We refer to the algorithm above as the CapApprx(ρ), where the prefix Cap emphasizes that this algorithm focuses on capacity constraints. In Step 0 above, we compute Φ j (P j , S j , R j ) only for all (P j , S j , R j ) ∈ Dom ρ × Dom ρ × Dom ρ , but we consider all values of z ∈ ℜ + when solving the problem max{z ∈ ℜ + : Φ 1 (0, 0, z) ≤ C}. It is possible to consider all values of z ∈ ℜ + in the last maximization problem, since we can use the dynamic program in (7) to compute Φ 1 (0, 0, z) for any
⌈z⌉)} and the last expression requires knowing Φ
The product offer decisions from the CapApprx(ρ) algorithm are given by (x 1 , . . . ,x n ). Our goal is to show that these product offer decisions are feasible and provide a performance guarantee for problem (5). To compute the total space consumption of the products offered in the CapApprx(ρ) algorithm, we define ϕ j recursively as
with the boundary condition that ϕ n+1 = 0 ifR n+1 ≤ 0 and ϕ n+1 = ∞ ifR n+1 > 0, where (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) and (R 1 , . . . ,R n ) are generated by the CapApprx(ρ) algorithm. In the next proposition, we relate {ϕ j : j = 1, . . . , n} to {Φ j (·, ·, ·) : j = 1, . . . , n} computed through the dynamic program in (7). This result is similar to Proposition 5 and its proof is in Appendix A.4.
Proposition 9
Assume that (P 1 , . . . ,P n ), (S 1 , . . . ,S n ) and (R 1 , . . . ,R n ) are generated by the
We can use Proposition 9 to show that the product offer decisions from the CapApprx(ρ) algorithm are feasible for problem (5). SinceR 1 = max{z ∈ ℜ + : Φ 1 (0, 0, z) ≤ C} in Step 0 of the CapApprx(ρ) algorithm, we have Φ 1 (0, 0,R 1 ) ≤ C. Noting thatP 1 = 0 andS 1 = 0, Proposition 9 implies that we also have Φ 1 (0, 0,R 1 ) = Φ 1 (P 1 ,S 1 ,R 1 ) ≥ ϕ 1 . Thus, the last two inequalities yield ϕ 1 ≤ C. On the other hand, noting the boundary conditions that we use when computing {ϕ j : j = 1, . . . , n}, we have ϕ n+1 = 0 ifR n+1 ≤ 0 and ϕ n+1 = ∞ ifR n+1 > 0. Similarly, by the boundary conditions of the dynamic program in (7), we have Φ n+1 (·, ·,R n+1 ) = 0 ifR n+1 ≤ 0 and Φ n+1 (·, ·,R n+1 ) = ∞ ifR n+1 > 0. Thus, we have ϕ n+1 = Φ n+1 (P n+1 ,S n+1 ,R n+1 ). In this case, adding (8) over all j = 1, . . . , n, we get ϕ 1 = ∑ n j=1 c jxj + Φ n+1 (P n+1 ,S n+1 ,R n+1 ). By the discussion at the beginning of this paragraph, we have ϕ 1 ≤ C, in which case, the last equality implies that
can take values only zero or infinity, the last inequality implies that Φ n+1 (P n+1 ,S n+1 ,R n+1 ) = 0, in which case, the last inequality yields ∑ n j=1 c jxj ≤ C. Thus, it follows that the product offer decisions (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) generated by the CapApprx(ρ) algorithm are feasible for problem (5).
The discussion at the end of the previous paragraph shows that Φ n+1 (P n+1 ,S n+1 ,R n+1 ) = 0. Having Φ n+1 (P n+1 ,S n+1 ,R n+1 ) = 0 also allows us to bound the expected revenue from the product offer decisions (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) generated by the CapApprx(ρ) algorithm. In particular, we let Rev be the expected revenue from the product offer decisions (x 1 , . . . ,x n ). SinceP j+1 and S j+1 in Step 1 of the CapApprx(ρ) algorithm are computed asP j+1 =P j + r j v jxj andS j+1 = S j + v jxj , we can use the same successive substitution idea that we use right before Lemma 4 to getP j = ∑ j−1 k=1 r k v kxk andS j = ∑ j−1 k=1 v kxk . Thus, the expected revenue from the product offer decisions (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) can be written as Rev = ∑ n j=1 λ j (
By the boundary condition of the dynamic program in (7), having Φ n+1 (P n+1 ,S n+1 ,R n+1 ) = 0 implies thatR n+1 ≤ 0. Otherwise, we would have Φ n+1 (P n+1 ,S n+1 ,R n+1 ) = ∞. Therefore, we obtain 0 ≥R n+1 =R 1 − Rev, which yields Rev ≥R 1 .
In the previous two paragraphs, we show that the product offer decisions generated by the CapApprx(ρ) algorithm are feasible for problem (5) and the expected revenue Rev from these product offer decisions satisfies Rev ≥R 1 . Furthermore, since the optimal objective value z * of problem (5) is given by z * = max{z ∈ ℜ + : ϑ 1 (0, 0, z) ≤ C}, we have C ≥ ϑ 1 (0, 0, z * ) ≥ Φ 1 (0, 0, z * /(1 + ρ) 3(n−1) ), where the second inequality follows from Proposition 8. In the next theorem, we put these observations together to give a performance guarantee for the product offer decisions generated by the CapApprx(ρ) algorithm.
Theorem 10
The product offer decisions generated by the CapApprx(ρ) algorithm are feasible for problem (5). Furthermore, letting Rev be the expected revenue from these product offer decisions and z * be the optimal objective value of problem (5), we have Rev ≥ z * /(1 + ρ) 3(n−1) .
Proof. The first part of the theorem follows from the discussion right before the theorem. By the same discussion, it also holds that Rev ≥R 1 and Φ 1 (0, 0, z * /(1+ρ) 3(n−1) ) ≤ C. We observe thatR 1 is computed asR 1 = max{z ∈ ℜ + : Φ 1 (0, 0, z) ≤ C} in Step 0 of the CapApprx(ρ) algorithm. In this case, having Φ 1 (0, 0, z * /(1 + ρ) 3(n−1) ) ≤ C implies that z * /(1 + ρ) 3(n−1) is a feasible solution to the problemR 1 = max{z ∈ ℜ + : Φ 1 (0, 0, z) ≤ C} and we obtainR 1 ≥ z * /(1 + ρ) 3(n−1) . Therefore, it follows that Rev ≥R 1 ≥ z * /(1 + ρ) 3(n−1) .
Next, we focus on the computation time of the algorithm. Without loss of generality, we assume that r j ≥ 1 and v j ≥ 1 for all j = 1, . . . , n and v 0 ≥ 1. We let R max = max{r j v j : j = 1, . . . , n} and V max = max{v j : j = 0, 1, . . . , n}, in which case,P j takes values in
. This observation implies that if the expected revenue that we want to generate from customer types {j, . . . , n} is nonzero but it is below λ min /((n + 1) V max ), then we can increase the expected revenue that we want to generate up to λ min /((n + 1) V max ) without loss of generality, since offering any of the products to any of the customer types immediately yields an expected revenue of at least λ min /((n + 1) V max ). Similarly, if the expected revenue that we want to generate from customer types {j, . . . , n} is above R max , then we can decrease the expected revenue that we want to generate down to R max . So, for each customer type j, in Step 0 of the CapApprx(ρ) algorithm, it is enough to compute
for the values of (P j , S j , R j ) such that P j ∈ {0, 1, 1
algorithm. The number of operations in the other steps of the CapApprx(ρ) algorithm is dominated by the number of operations in Step 0. Using this computation time analysis along with the performance guarantee in Theorem 10, the next theorem gives an FPTAS for problem (5). This theorem is analogous to Theorem 7 and its proof is in Appendix A.5.
Theorem 11
Letting z * be the optimal objective value of problem (5), there exists an algorithm such that for any ϵ ∈ (0, 1), the algorithm runs in O(n 4 log(nR max ) log(nV max ) log(nR max V max /λ min ) / ϵ 3 ) operations and generates product offer decisions with an expected revenue of at least (1 − ϵ) z * .
Numerical Study
In this section, we present a numerical study to check the practical performance of the Apprx(ρ) algorithm given in Section 3. To conserve space, we focus on problem (1), which does not have a constraint on the total space consumption of the offered products.
Numerical Setup
In our numerical setup, we generate a large number of problem instances. For each problem instance, we use the Apprx(ρ) algorithm to obtain a solution for problem (1) with a certain performance guarantee. To get a more precise understanding of the performance of this solution, we use a variant of the dynamic program in (3) to obtain an upper bound on the optimal expected revenue for each problem instance. We check the gap between the upper bound on the optimal expected revenue and the expected revenue from the solution obtained by the Apprx(ρ) algorithm. In our numerical setup, we use the following strategy to generate our problem instances. To come up with the revenues of the products, we generate θ j from the uniform distribution over [1, 20] for all j = 1, . . . , n. We reindex (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ) in increasing order such that θ 1 ≤ . . . ≤ θ n . In this case, the revenue of product j is given by r j = θ j , which implies that the revenues of the products satisfy r 1 ≤ . . . ≤ r n . We recall that the consideration set of a customer of type k is {1, . . . , k}. In our numerical setup, a customer of type k is, roughly, more price sensitive than a customer of type k + 1, in the sense that the consideration set of a customer of type k includes the first k products with the lowest prices, whereas the consideration set of a customer of type k + 1 includes the first k + 1 products with the lowest prices. To come up with the preference weights of the products, we generate γ j from the uniform distribution over [1, 50] for all j = 1, . . . , n. We reindex (γ 1 , . . . , γ n ) in decreasing order such that γ 1 ≥ . . . ≥ γ n . In this case, the preference weight of product j is given by v j = γ j , which implies that the preference weights of the products satisfy v 1 ≥ . . . ≥ v n . In this case, the revenues and preference weights of the products satisfy r 1 ≤ . . . ≤ r n and v 1 ≥ . . . ≥ v n so that the products with higher prices also have lower preference weights.
In our numerical setup, we assume that customers of different types have different preference weights for the no purchase option. To incorporate this extension into our FPTAS, we need to replace v 0 in the dynamic program in (3) and in Step 1 of the Apprx(ρ) algorithm with v 0j , where v 0j is the preference weight of the no purchase option for a customer of type j. To come up with the preference weight for the no purchase option, we set v 0k = P 0 ∑ k j=1 v j /(1 − P 0 ) for all k = 1, . . . , n, where P 0 is a parameter that we vary in our numerical setup. Thus, we observe that if we offer all of the products, then a customer of type k leaves the system without purchasing anything
Thus, a larger value for P 0 implies that customers are more likely to leave the system without a purchase. To come up with the probability of arrival for each customer type, we use three different approaches. First, we generate β k from the uniform distribution over [0, 1] for all k = 1, . . . , n and set
which corresponds to a situation where the probabilities of arrival for different customer types are somewhat balanced. Second, we generate β k from the uniform distribution over [0, 1] 
As discussed in the previous paragraph, a customer of type k is more price sensitive than a customer of type k + 1. Therefore, reindexing (β 1 , . . . , β n ) in decreasing order yields a situation where the probabilities of arrival for more price sensitive customers are larger. Third, we generate β k from the uniform distribution over [0, 1] for all k = 1, . . . , n, reindex (β 1 , . . . , β n ) in increasing order such that β 1 ≤ . . . ≤ β n and set λ k = β k /( ∑ n j=1 β j ), which yields a situation where the probabilities of arrival for more price insensitive customers are larger.
In all of our test problems, the number of products and the number of customer types are n = 30. Noting the discussion at the end of the previous paragraph, we use CT ∈ {BL, PS, PI} to denote the strategy that we use to generate the arrival probabilities for the customer types, where BL corresponds to the situation where the different customer types are balanced, PS corresponds to the situation where the price sensitive customers are more likely to arrive and PI corresponds to the situation where the price insensitive customers are more likely to arrive. In our numerical setup, we vary (CT, P 0 ) over {BL, PS, PI} × {0.1, 0.3}, which yields six parameter combinations. In each parameter combination, we generate 100 individual problem instances by using the approach described in the previous two paragraphs.
Numerical Results
For each problem instance, we use the FPTAS in Section 3 with three different performance guarantees. In particular, we use our FPTAS to obtain a solution to problem (1) that provides at least 3/4, 1/2 and 1/4 of the optimal expected revenue. Noting the proof of Theorem 7, we can use the Apprx(ρ) algorithm with ρ = ϵ/(4n) to obtain a solution to problem (1) that provides at least 1 − ϵ fraction of the optimal expected revenue. To get a more precise understanding of the performance of this solution, we solve the dynamic program
with the boundary condition that Ψ n+1 (·, ·) = 0. Lemma 15 in Appendix A.6 shows that we have
. By the discussion that follows the dynamic program in (2), V 1 (0, 0) corresponds to the optimal expected revenue in problem (1). Therefore, Ψ 1 (0, 0) provides an upper bound on the optimal expected revenue in problem (1) and we can assess the optimality gap of a solution by comparing the expected revenue provided by this solution with the upper bound on the optimal expected revenue. Table 1 summarizes our computational results. On the left side of the table, we show the parameter combinations for our test problems by using the pair (P 0 , CT). We recall that we generate 100 problem instances in each parameter combination. In the rest of the Table 1 : Performance of the Apprx(ρ) algorithm with different performance guarantees.
of four consecutive columns. Each one of the three blocks corresponds to one of the three cases where we run the Apprx(ρ) algorithm to obtain a solution to problem (1) that provides at least 1/4, 1/2 and 3/4 of the optimal expected revenue. The first column in each block shows the average percent gap between the upper bound on the optimal expected revenue provided by the dynamic program in (9) and the expected revenue from by the solution obtained by the Apprx(ρ) algorithm, where the average is computed over 100 problem instances in a parameter combination. In particular, using Rev k to denote the expected revenue from the solution obtained by the Apprx(ρ) algorithm for problem instance k and UppBnd k to denote the upper bound on the optimal expected revenue provided by the dynamic program in (9) for problem instance k, the first column in each block shows the average of the data {100 × (UppBnd
second, third and fourth columns in each block respectively show the maximum, 75th percentile and 95th percentile of the percent gaps between the upper bound on the optimal expected revenue provided by the dynamic program in (9) and the expected revenue from the solution obtained by the Apprx(ρ) algorithm. In other words, the second, third and fourth columns in each block respectively show the maximum, 75th percentile and 95th percentile of the data {100 × (UppBnd
When computing an upper bound on the optimal expected revenue by using the dynamic program in (9), we use the value of ρ that provides a performance guarantee of 3/4 in the Apprx(ρ) algorithm.
Our results indicate that the practical performance of the Apprx(ρ) algorithm can be quite strong. When we use this algorithm to obtain a solution that provides at least 1/4 of the optimal expected revenue, the maximum optimality gap of the solutions that we obtain is actually 9.61%. In this case, the average optimality gap of the solutions turns out to be about 2.27%. Not surprisingly, as we run the Apprx(ρ) algorithm to obtain solutions with better performance guarantees, the optimality gaps of the solutions indeed decrease. When we use the Apprx(ρ) algorithm to obtain a solution that provides at least 3/4 of the optimal expected revenue, the maximum optimality gap of the solutions that we obtain is actually 6.97%. In this case, the average optimality gap of the solutions turns out to be about 1.79%. Therefore, our results indicate that the practical performance of the Apprx(ρ) algorithm can be significantly stronger than what is predicted by our theoretical analysis. Figure 1: Consideration sets with a tree structure.
Conclusions
In this paper, we studied assortment optimization problems when customers choose under the multinomial logit model with nested considerations sets. We showed that the problem is NP-complete. We gave an FPTAS. We extended our FPTAS to the case where each product consumes a certain amount of space and there is a constraint on the total space consumption of the offered products. We considered the case where the consideration sets of different customer types are nested. The nested consideration set structure captures a practically useful case where customers drop products from consideration based on a cutoff value for a particular attribute. It is possible to extend our results to more general consideration sets with a tree structure. In this setting, the products are placed at the nodes of a tree and consideration sets of different customer types correspond to different paths in the tree that starts at the root node. For example, Figure 1 shows nested consideration sets with a tree structure. The consideration sets in Figure  1 are {1}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 3, 6} and {1, 3, 7}. All of our results in the paper go through with little modifications when the consideration sets have such a tree structure. The key observation to make the extension is the following. Consider the customer type with consideration set {1, 2}. Once we decide which of the products in this consideration set are offered, the expected revenue from customers with consideration sets {1, 2, 4} and {1, 2, 5} only depend on the sums ∑ 2 j=1 r j v j x j and ∑ 2 j=1 v j x j . Therefore, if the consideration sets have a tree structure, then we can still formulate the assortment optimization problem as a dynamic program. By discretizing the state variable in this dynamic program, we can develop an FPTAS.
There are important directions for future research. One direction is to work with other consideration set structures that both have practical importance and yield tractable assortment optimization problems. Also, we assumed that the prices of the products are fixed throughout this paper. One can consider the case where the firm picks the assortment of products to offer and the prices of the products. This variant of the problem brings an additional layer of complexity and our dynamic programming approach does not immediately apply, since the consideration sets of the customers may depend on what prices are picked for the products.
A Appendix: Omitted Proofs
In this section, we provide the proofs that are omitted in the paper.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
We show the result by using induction over the customer types. For any x n ∈ {0, 1}, using the assumption thatP n ≥ P n /(1 + ρ) andŜ n ≤ (1 + ρ) S n , we havê
Therefore, it follows that
and the result holds for customer type n. Assuming that the result holds for customer type j + 1, we show that the result holds for customer type j.
, which is the desired claim. Following the same line of reasoning, it is possible to show that for S j andŜ j satisfyinĝ
. In this case, by the induction assumption, we
Furthermore, using the same argument that is used to obtain the inequality in (10), it is possible to show that
If we use these observations in the dynamic program in (3), then the desired result follows by noting that
where the inequality uses (
A.2 Proof of Lemma 4
We show the result by using induction over the customer types. For any x n ∈ {0, 1}, using the assumption thatP n ≥ P n andŜ n ≤ S n , we have (
, in which case, the dynamic program in (3) yields
Therefore, the result holds for customer type n. Assuming that the result holds for customer type j + 1, we show that the result holds for customer type j. Using the assumption thatP j ≥ P j and
Since ⌊x⌋ and ⌈x⌉ are both increasing functions of x, the applying these functions on both sides of the last two inequalities, we have
in which case, by the induction assumption, it follows that
for any x j ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore, we obtain
where the inequality is by (
for any x j ∈ {0, 1}, which are both shown earlier in the proof.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 8
We need two preliminary results to show Proposition 8. In the rest of this section, for notational brevity, we define
, which is useful for computing the third argument of ϑ j+1 (·, ·, ·) and Φ j+1 (·, ·, ·) in the dynamic programs in (6) and (7). The proof of Proposition 8 uses the next two lemmas, which are analogous to Lemmas 2 and 4.
Lemma 12 Assume that
Proof. We show the result by using induction over the customer types. Noting the assumption thatP n ≥ P n /(1 + ρ) andŜ n ≤ (1 + ρ) S n , the same computation that is used in (10) shows that (1+ρ) 2 (P n +r n v n x n )/(v 0 +Ŝ n +v n x n ) ≥ (P n +r n v n x n )/(v 0 +S n +v nxn ) for any x n ∈ {0, 1}. Using this inequality and the assumption thatR n ≤ R n /(1 + ρ) 2 , for any x n ∈ {0, 1}, we get
By the inequality above, having
In the boundary condition of the dynamic program in (7), we have
irrespective of the first two arguments of these functions. In this case, since the only possible values that Φ n+1 (·, ·, ·) can take are zero or infinity, we obtain
. So, by (7), we get
which shows that the result holds for customer type n. Assuming that the result holds for customer type j + 1, we show that the result holds for customer type j. Using the assumption thatP j ≥ P j /(1 + ρ) andŜ j ≤ (1 + ρ) S j , we can follow the same argument in the proof of Lemma 2 to show that
On the other hand, using the assumption
, we can follow the same argument that is used to obtain the inequality in (11) to show that
Therefore, by the discussion in this paragraph, we have the inequalities
. In this case, by (7), we get
where the inequality is by the fact that
) for any x j ∈ {0, 1} by the induction assumption. Furthermore, we have the chain of inequalities
For notational brevity, we let β = 1/(1 + ρ) 3(n−j) throughout the rest of the proof, in which case, the inequality above reads
, in which case, noting the last inequality, it follows that
for any x j ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore, the discussion so far in this paragraph shows that
For the moment, we assume that R j+1 (P j , S j , β R j ) > 0. Since Φ j+1 (P j+1 , S j+1 , R j+1 ) is increasing in R j+1 by Lemma 13 and we have (1 + ρ) R j+1 (P j , S j , β R j , x j ) ≥ ⌈R j+1 (P j , S j , β R j , x j )⌉, it follows that we have Φ j+1 (⌊P j + r j v j x j ⌋ , ⌈S j + v j x j ⌉ , (1 + ρ) R j+1 (P j , S j , βR j , x j )) ≥ Φ j+1 (⌊P j + r j v j x j ⌋ , ⌈S j + v j x j ⌉ , ⌈R j+1 (P j , S j , β R j , x j )⌉). One the other hand, we assume that R j+1 (P j , S j , β R j ) ≤ 0. In this case, the crucial observation is that the third component of the state variable in the dynamic program in (7) can only decrease as the decision epochs progress and it is the sign of this component that affects the boundary condition. Thus, if R j+1 andR j+1 both satisfy R j+1 ≤ 0 andR j+1 ≤ 0, then we have Φ j+1 (P j+1 , S j+1 , R j+1 ) = Φ j+1 (P j+1 , S j+1 ,R j+1 ). So, if (1 + ρ) R j+1 (P j , S j , β R j ) ≤ 0, then we have ⌈R j+1 (P j , S j , β R j )⌉ ≤ 0 as well and we obtain Φ j+1 (⌊P j + r j v j x j ⌋ , ⌈S j + v j x j ⌉ , (1 + ρ) R j+1 (P j , S j , β R j , x j )) = Φ j+1 (⌊P j + r j v j x j ⌋ , ⌈S j + v j x j ⌉ , ⌈R j+1 (P j , S j , β R j , x j )⌉). Therefore, under both assumptions, it follows that we have the inequality Φ j+1 (⌊P j +r j v j x j ⌋ , ⌈S j +v j x j ⌉ , (1+ρ) R j+1 (P j , S j , β R j , x j )) ≥ Φ j+1 (⌊P j + r j v j x j ⌋ , ⌈S j + v j x j ⌉ , ⌈R j+1 (P j , S j , β R j , x j )⌉). Using the last inequality together with the chain of inequalities in (12), for any x j ∈ {0, 1}, we obtain
In this case, we use the definitions of ϑ j (P j , S j , R j ) and Φ j (P j , S j , β R j ) in the dynamic programs in (6) and (7) to obtain the final result as ϑ j (P j , S j , R j ) = min
where the inequality uses the fact that ϑ j+1 (P j + r j v j x j , S j + v j x j , R j+1 (P j , S j , R j , x j )) ≥ Φ j+1 (⌊P j + r j v j x j ⌋ , ⌈S j + v j x j ⌉ , ⌈R j+1 (P j , S j , β R j , x j )⌉) for any x j ∈ {0, 1}.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 9
For notational brevity, we define R j+1 (P j , S j , R j , x j ) = R j − λ j
. We show the result by using induction over the customer types. By the definition of ϕ j , we have ϕ n+1 = 0 ifR n+1 ≤ 0 and ϕ n+1 = ∞ ifR n+1 > 0. Similarly, the boundary condition of the dynamic program in (7) implies that Φ n+1 (P n+1 ,S n+1 ,R n+1 ) = 0 ifR n+1 ≤ 0 and Φ n+1 (P n+1 ,S n+1 ,R n+1 ) = ∞ ifR n+1 > 0. Therefore, we have ϕ n+1 = Φ n+1 (P n+1 ,S n+1 ,R n+1 ) and the result holds for the boundary condition. Assuming that the result holds for customer type j + 1, we show that the result holds for customer type j. By the induction assumption, we have ϕ j+1 ≤ Φ j+1 (P j+1 ,S j+1 ,R j+1 ). Also, sinceP j+1 ≥ ⌊P j+1 ⌋,S j+1 ≤ ⌈S j+1 ⌉ andR j+1 ≤ ⌈R j+1 ⌉, it follows from Lemma 13 that Φ j+1 (P j+1 ,S j+1 ,R j+1 ) ≤ Φ j+1 (⌊P j+1 ⌋, ⌈S j+1 ⌉, ⌈R j+1 ⌉). So, the last two inequalities imply that ϕ j+1 ≤ Φ j+1 (P j+1 ,S j+1 ,R j+1 ) ≤ Φ j+1 (⌊P j+1 ⌋, ⌈S j+1 ⌉, ⌈R j+1 ⌉) = Φ j+1 (⌊P j + r j v jxj ⌋ , ⌈S j + v jxj ⌉ , ⌈R j+1 (P j ,S j ,R j ,x j )⌉), where the equality follows from the way we computeP j+1 ,S j+1 andR j+1 in Step 1 of the CapApprx(ρ) algorithm. Since ϕ j+1 ≤ Φ j+1 (⌊P j + r j v jxj ⌋ , ⌈S j + v jxj ⌉ , ⌈R j+1 (P j ,S j ,R j ,x j )⌉) by the last chain of inequalities, we get
where the first equality is by the definition of ϕ j , the second equality is by the way we computex j in Step 1 of the CapApprx(ρ) algorithm and the third equality is by (7).
A.5 Proof of Theorem 11
We run the CapApprx(ρ) algorithm with ρ = ϵ/(6n) and let Rev be the expected revenue from the product offer decisions generated by this algorithm. By Theorem 6, it holds that z * ≤ (1 + ϵ/(6n)) 3(n−1) Rev. For ϵ ∈ (0, 1), since (1 + ϵ/(6n)) 3(n−1) ≤ exp(ϵ/2) ≤ 1 + ϵ, we obtain z * ≤ (1 + ϵ) Rev. Multiplying both sides of this inequality with 1 − ϵ, we have (1 − ϵ) z * ≤ (1 − ϵ 2 ) Rev ≤ Rev. Thus, the expected revenue from the product offer decisions generated by the CapApprx(ρ) algorithm with ρ = ϵ/(6n) is at least (1 − ϵ) z * . As discussed right before Theorem 11, the CapApprx(ρ) algorithm runs in O(n log(nR max ) log(nV max ) log(nR max V max /λ min ) / ρ 3 ) operations. Replacing ρ with ϵ/6n yields the desired computation time.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 15
In this section, we show that if {Ψ j (·, ·) : j = 1, . . . , n} are computed through the dynamic program in (9), then we have Ψ j (P j , S j ) ≥ V j (P j , S j ) for all j = 1, . . . , n. In the next lemma, we give a preliminary result that shows that Ψ j (P j , S j ) is increasing in P j and decreasing in S j . The proof of this lemma is similar to that of Lemma 4 and we omit the proof.
Lemma 14
Assume that (P j , S j ) and (P j ,Ŝ j ) satisfyP j ≥ P j andŜ j ≤ S j . Then, we have Ψ j (P j ,Ŝ j ) ≥ Ψ j (P j , S j ).
In the next lemma, we show that if {Ψ j (·, ·) : j = 1, . . . , n} are computed through the dynamic program in (9), then we have Ψ j (P j , S j ) ≥ V j (P j , S j ) for all j = 1, . . . , n.
Lemma 15 For all j = 1, . . . , n, we have Ψ j (P j , S j ) ≥ V j (P j , S j ).
Proof. We show the result by using induction over the customer types. Since we have V n+1 (P n+1 , S n+1 ) = 0 = Ψ n+1 (P n+1 , S n+1 ), comparing the dynamic programs in (2) and (9), it follows that V n (P n , S n ) = Ψ n (P n , S n ) and the result holds for customer type n. Assuming that the result holds for customer type j + 1, we show that the result holds for customer type j. By the induction assumption, we have Ψ j+1 (P j + r j v j x j , S j + v j x j ) ≥ V j+1 (P j + r j v j x j , S j + v j x j ) for any x j ∈ {0, 1}. Also, since ⌈P j + r j v j x j ⌉ ≥ P j + r j v j x j and ⌊S j + v j x j ⌋ ≤ S j + v j x j , Lemma 14 for customer type j + 1 implies that Ψ j+1 (⌈P j + r j v j x j ⌉ , ⌊S j + v j x j ⌋) ≥ Ψ j+1 (P j + r j v j x j , S j + v j x j ). The last two inequalities yield Ψ j+1 (⌈P j + r j v j x j ⌉ , ⌊S j + v j x j ⌋) ≥ V j+1 (P j + r j v j x j , S j + v j x j ) for any x j ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore, we have Ψ j (P j , S j ) = max
where the inequality above follows by noting the fact that Ψ j+1 (⌈P j + r j v j x j ⌉ , ⌊S j + v j x j ⌋) ≥ V j+1 (P j + r j v j x j , S j + v j x j ) for any x j ∈ {0, 1}.
